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In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the notion that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, a weaker form of internalism avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain the mentioned conception concerning moral language and motivation. Moreover, I argue that externalism in conjunction with a pragmatic claim which employs Grice’s concept of generalized conversational implicature is able to account for both these conceptions and that it consequently avoids the internalist dilemma. Thus, there is reason to think that this view is preferable to internalism.
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1. Introduction
There is broad agreement in metaethics that there is a strong connection between moral language and motivation, but significant disagreement as to how it should be understood. According to internalism, there is a nontrivial and conceptually necessary relation between moral judgments and motivation whereas externalism denies this. At the same time, there is disagreement within the internalist camp about how strong this necessary relation should be understood to be. On strong internalism, it holds for all persons whereas on weak internalism it only holds for those who satisfy a certain condition. In this paper, I maintain that internalism faces a dilemma. Moreover, I argue that externalism in combination with a certain pragmatic claim is preferable to internalism since it avoids this dilemma.
	In the next section, I point out that the basic reason for adopting internalism is that it is thought to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. In Section 3, it is found that most internalists have abandoned strong internalism since it fails to account for the notion that a person who holds a moral judgment need not be accordingly motivated if she suffers from a certain mental condition. In order to avoid this difficulty, internalists have adopted weak internalism. It is found that the most promising version of weak internalism is what I refer to as ‘rationalist internalism’. In Section 4, I argue rationalist internalists are committed to an implausible claim about the connection between normative judgments and motivation which I refer to as ‘normative internalism’. It is argued that this problem forces rationalist internalists to accept a yet weaker version of rationalist internalism. In Section 5, I argue that internalism faces a dilemma. On the one hand, strong internalism can explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the notion that a person who holds a moral judgment need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, the most plausible version of weak internalism, the new version of rationalist internalism, can explain the latter notion, but not the first. It is also argued that the internalist dilemma generalizes to other versions of weak internalism. In Sections 6 and 7, I defend a pragmatic claim about the connection between moral language and motivation. Moreover, I argue that the conjunction of externalism and this pragmatic claim avoids the internalist dilemma. 
It should be observed that the pragmatic claim I propose in principle is available to both externalists and internalists. In particular, it is possible to maintain that the most plausible version of internalism explains the connection between moral judgments and motivation whereas the pragmatic claim explains our intuitive conception of the connection between moral language and motivation.​[1]​ However, since (a) the basic reason to adopt internalism is that it can explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation, but (b) the most plausible version of internalism fails to do so, and (c) externalism in conjunction with the pragmatic claim is able to explain this conception, and (d) this view avoids the internalist dilemma, it is plausible to conclude that (e) in lack of a better argument for internalism, we should instead adopt the conjunction of externalism and the pragmatic claim. In other words, I argue that we need not adopt internalism to explain our conception of moral language and motivation in which case the basic reason—indeed, the reason—to accept this view has evaporated. This fact is admittedly compatible with us trying to combine a version of internalism with a pragmatic explanation of our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. However, since internalism has lost its basic underpinning this step would merely constitute an unmotivated restriction on our overall metaethical view. Thus, in want of a better argument for internalism, we should accept that there is no nontrivial conceptual necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation—hence, deny internalism and accept externalism—and adopt the pragmatic claim.​[2]​ However, this also means that if there is a convincing argument for a certain version of internalism, defenders of this view might combine it with the pragmatic claim I propose.

2. Strong Internalism
Consider the following standard formulation of internalism: 

It is necessary that if a person S judges that it is morally right that she s, then S is motivated to . 

There are particularly three considerations that are important to observe about my understanding of internalism. First, I will conceive of internalism as a conceptually necessary claim. Second, internalist claims can vary in strength depending on whether they apply to all persons or merely to persons who fulfil a certain condition.​[3]​ Third, I will take internalist claims to mean that a person who judges that it is right that she s needs to be motivated to some extent to , not that she is most motivated to .​[4]​ Finally, internalism should be understood to concern a person’s judgment that it is right that she s in a certain situation and her motivation to  in that situation. Similar considerations hold for the view I refer to as ‘normative internalism’.
	Externalism entails the denial of internalism. On this view, there is no nontrivial conceptually necessary between a person’s moral judgment and her motivation to act.  
	Consider:

	Strong internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and person S, if 	S judges that it is morally right that she s, then S is motivated to .​[5]​ 

The main argument for internalism is that it is able to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. In fact, virtually all authors who are attracted by internalism appeal explicitly or implicitly to this consideration, and it is reasonable to regard it as the prime basis for internalism. Importantly, this fundamental argument for internalism is employed by strong as well as weak internalists, in spite of the fact that their claims differ considerably in strength, thereby suggesting that it provides support to internalism in general. In the typical argument, we are asked to imagine a person who utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to  but who has no motivation whatsoever to .​[6]​ For example, try to imagine a person who says ‘Actually, it’s right to give some money to those who need it more than I do’, but who is not motivated at all to actually do so. We doubtless respond to such thought experiments by finding them puzzling. After all, in case a person utters such a sentence, we strongly presume that she is motivated in accordance with it, and in case she is not, we want an explanation as to why she makes the utterance. Strong internalism has a ready explanation of our response. On this view, a sentence to the effect that it is right to  expresses, by virtue of its conventional meaning, a judgment that necessarily is accompanied by motivation. Moreover, this holds for all persons. The explanation of why we find the mentioned cases puzzling is thus that we know, in so far as we know the meaning of the sentence, that any person who holds such a judgment has to be motivated to act in accordance with it.

3. Rationalist Internalism
Most internalists have come to the conclusion that strong internalism is mistaken because there might be cases where a person thinks that it is right that she s, but is not motivated to , because she suffers from some mental condition, such as apathy, depression, emotional disturbance, addiction, or compulsion. This has made them suggest a weaker type of internalism:

Weak internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and person S 	who satisfies condition C, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then S is motivated to .

Weak internalism constitutes a type of internalism where condition C can be specified in different ways. 
In order for weak internalism to be a proper version of internalism, C has to be understood in a way which does not trivialize the internalist claim. Thus, C cannot be understood to simply state that a person who satisfies it is motivated in accordance with her moral judgments. Similarly, it cannot be understood as a mere ad hoc condition, such as a negation of a disjunction of mental conditions which are thought to result in the fact that a person is not accordingly motivated. It has however been shown extremely difficult for internalists to spell out C in a way which satisfies this constraint. According to one suggestion, C consists in ‘normal conditions’.​[7]​ However, as far as I know, no elucidation of this reading of C has been proposed which satisfies the mentioned constraint, and it is even hard to see how such an account can be provided. 
The version of weak internalism which seems most likely to avoid this difficulty is one which specifies C in terms of rationality: 

	Rationalist internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and 	rational person S, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then S is 	motivated to .

According to rationalist internalism, it has to be something about a moral judgment which explains that it is only if a person is rational that she needs to be motivated in accordance with it. The most plausible explanation is that moral judgments consist in judgments about what there are normative reasons to do. It seems evident that there is a connection between a person’s normative judgments, her rationality, and her motivation to act. If a person’s motivation to act fails to accord with her views about what she has reason to do, this is grounds to think that she is irrational. 
This is the intuitive line of thought which leads up to rationalist internalism, but we need to formulate it more exactly.​[8]​ We reach rationalist internalism via two claims, what I will refer to as ‘rationalism’ and ‘normative internalism’.

(1) Rationalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and person S, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then S judges that she has a normative reason to .

Rationalism captures the notion that moral judgments consist in normative judgments. 

(2) Normative internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and rational person S, if S judges that she has a normative reason to , then S is motivated to . 

Normative internalism captures the notion that a person is irrational unless she is motivated in accordance with her normative judgments.​[9]​ We may now infer:

(3) Rationalist internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and rational person S, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then S is motivated to .

What I said above implies that rationality has to be understood in such a way that it does not trivialize rationalist internalism and it might be argued that it is difficult to find a characterization of rationality which satisfies this constraint.​[10]​ However, having identified condition C in terms of rationality is a significant improvement and I will not be concerned with this problem in what follows. 
We saw earlier that strong internalism seems able to explain our conception of moral language and motivation, but that it is too strong since it cannot account for cases where the connection between moral judgments and motivation is defeated. In the two subsequent sections, I will argue that weak internalism faces the reverse problem: it is too weak to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. I will do so by focusing on normative internalism.
	
4. Normative Internalism
In metaethical discussions about the connection between normative judgments, rationality, and motivation, a person’s various normative judgments are often considered in isolation from each other. Normative internalism in (2) might then seem plausible. However, when we consider a person’s different normative judgments we can see that this view is much less appealing.
	One type of case which constitutes a problem for (2) is the following. Assume that a person thinks that what she has absolutely strongest reason to do in a certain situation is to perform an action , but that she also thinks that she has an extremely much weaker reason to perform another action ψ. Assume further that she thinks that  and ψ are practically incompatible in the sense that she cannot do both. It then seems reasonable to maintain that she has to be motivated to  in so far as she is rational.​[11]​ Thus, the following claim seems plausible: 

	It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and rational person S, if S judges 	that she has strongest normative reason to , then S is motivated to .
 
However, normative internalism in (2) is a much stronger claim. It entails that it conceptually necessary that for each of the countless actions a rational person thinks she has a reason to perform, she has to be motivated to do that particular action however weak she thinks that reason is. According to (2), it is conceptually necessary that the person above is motivated to ψ as well in so far as she is rational. It follows that she has to be motivated to ψ in order to be entirely rational and that she has to be irrational to the extent she is not motivated to ψ. However, it appears that she might be completely rational even if she is not motivated to ψ.​[12]​ 
	Consider an example. Assume that a person who is seriously ill knows that undergoing a certain medical treatment is the only way to save her life. She consequently thinks that what she has absolutely strongest reason to do is to accept the treatment. However, imagine that her doctor informs her that if she goes through the treatment, she will not be able to drink coffee for one minute. Assume that she therefore thinks that she has some, but extremely much weaker, reason to decline the treatment. We can admit that she might be motivated to decline the treatment even if she is rational. However, (2) entails that it conceptually necessary that she has to be motivated to decline the treatment in order to be entirely rational; that she needs to be to a certain extent irrational unless she is motivated in that way. However, I think we accept that she might be entirely rational even if she is not motivated to decline the treatment.
	It might be objected that this argument does not take into consideration the distinction between dispositional and occurrent mental states. A mental state can be understood as a dispositional state which might be activated in the form of corresponding occurrent state.​[13]​ This means that, according to normative internalism in (2), it is conceptually necessary that if a rational person judges that she a reason , then she is motivated to  in the sense of being disposed to , but it does not follow that she has an occurrent motivation to . 
However, I do not think that rationalist internalists can save (2) merely by making the reference to dispositions explicit. First, I think we respond in the same way if we formulate the cases under consideration in terms of dispositions. Return to the person in the example above. It does not seem conceptually necessary that she has to be disposed to decline the medical treatment in order to be entirely rational. And it seems incorrect to claim that it is conceptually necessary that she needs to be irrational to the extent she is not disposed in that manner. Second, we should be careful not to draw the conclusion that a person has a certain disposition on the wrong grounds. According to a simple conditional analysis of dispositions, an object x is disposed to M when conditions C are present in so far as x has an intrinsic property B such that x would M in C. It should first be stressed that what is relevant to the present issue is not simply whether it is plausible to think that a person has a certain disposition. The relevant issue is much more limited, namely whether it is conceptually necessary that if a person thinks that she has absolutely strongest reason to , and a much weaker reason to ψ, then it follows from this particular fact she has to be disposed to ψ in order to be entirely rational. We should thus not be confused by the simple fact that we easily can imagine various circumstances in which the person in our example is disposed to decline the treatment, since this does not show that the mentioned view is correct. Relatedly, it has shown to be extremely difficult to specify conditions C even for simple examples of dispositions, and there is no reason to think that dispositions to act constitute any exception. As is made clear in the literature, it is not correct to claim that an object is, say, fragile merely because we can imagine some conditions that would make it crackle.​[14]​ A similar point holds for dispositions for action. These considerations suggest that we should not be misled to think that the person in our example has to be disposed to decline the treatment merely because we can imagine some conditions in which she would do so.​[15]​ Third, the fact that it is difficult to specify in what conditions a person has a disposition to perform an action indicates that even if (2) is true, it is not an apparent conceptual truth. I will return to a similar point below.
	Thus far, we have been concerned with one type of case which provides a difficulty for (2). However, there are also other considerations that put doubts on this view.​[16]​ 
Assume again that a person thinks what she has strongest reason to do is to accept a certain medical treatment because undergoing the treatment would save her life, but that she also thinks that she has a much weaker reason to decline the treatment because it would make her unable to drink coffee for one minute. However, assume now that she also thinks that if she is motivated to decline the treatment, this will make it more difficult for her to actually attain it. For example, she might think that if she is motivated to decline the treatment, this will start a psychological process in her which ultimately will make her give in and decline the treatment. In that case it seems even more incorrect to maintain that she needs to be irrational unless she is motivated to decline the treatment.
	There is also an entirely distinct type of case which provides a difficulty for (2). Assume that a person thinks that she has a reason to  and a reason to ψ. Assume further that she thinks that her reason to  is exactly as strong as her reason to ψ. Lastly, assume that she thinks that  and ψ are practically incompatible. According to (2) it is conceptually necessary that she has to be motivated to perform both  and ψ in order to be entirely rational. However, this does not seem correct, especially not if the actions in question are inconsequential. Consider a person who thinks about what to eat for dinner. She thinks that her reason to have pasta is a strong as her reason to have a pizza. We might also assume that she thinks that which alternative she chooses is of very little importance but that she cannot have both. We can admit that she might be motivated to have both pizza and pasta even if she is entirely rational. However, it does not seem that it is conceptually necessary that she has to be thus motivated in order to be entirely rational and that she needs to be irrational to the extent she fails to be motivated in that manner. In such cases, it seems that, from the perspective of rationality, the person is free to lack one of the motivations and merely be led by her pure inclinations.  
	In the various types of cases we have considered it seems plausible to say that it is rationally permissible for the person in question to be motivated to perform the action at issue, but that she need not be rationally required to be thus motivated and that she need not be irrational to the extent she fails to be motivated in that way.​[17]​ This conclusion finds support in our concept of rationality that internalists appeal to. The term ‘irrational’ is used to categorize various forms of failure in mental functioning, which is shown by the various cases standardly used to exemplify it, such as apathy, depression, emotional disturbance, addiction, and compulsion. Now, it is such cases that advocates of rationalist internalism appeal to when they introduce the notion of rationality to save internalism. And it is such cases that justify our criticism of people when we consider them as being mentally malfunctioning in the relevant respect.​[18]​ However, our responses to the examples above provide evidence that we do not think that it is conceptually necessary that the people in the kind of cases we have considered are mentally malfunctioning in the relevant way. 
	It might be objected that whether a claim is conceptually necessary need not be obvious.​[19]​ Internalists can then argue that it might seem possible to think that a person is entirely rational even if she does not fulfil the requirement in (2), although this thesis actually is true. 
In reply, it should first be pointed out that even if considerations of such examples do not demonstrate that (2) does not hold, they provide some evidence that it does not, since they indicate that competent language users need not adhere to it. It seems fair to claim that, in view of these responses, the burden of proof is on defenders of (2). 
Second, what is most important for the present inquiry is that even if (2) is true, it is not an apparent conceptual truth, which in turn means that rationalist internalism in (3) is unable to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. To see this, assume for the sake of the argument that (2) is correct. Nevertheless, our responses to the type of cases we have considered show that it is not apparent to us as competent language users that the connection between normative judgments, rationality, and motivation as stated in (2) is the case. On the contrary, our responses suggest that it is quite reasonable for us to doubt this view. However, in order for (2) to be a part of an explanation of our straightforward responses to various cases, it would have to be in the foreground of our conception of this connection, at least to the extent that we should not outrightly be prepared to question it. This suggests that (3), which is logically dependent on (2), fails to explain why we find it so puzzling that a person who says that it is right to  is not motivated to . In other words: If it is not apparent to us that a person who thinks that she has a reason to  needs to lack in rationality if she is not motivated to , it is not apparent to us that a person who thinks that it is right to , where this is assumed to entail that she thinks that she has a reason to , needs to lack in rationality if she is not motivated to . Likewise, if it reasonable for us to doubt the former, it is reasonable for us to doubt the latter. As a consequence, (3) cannot explain our straightforward intuition that the cases internalists appeal to are so puzzling.
	In view of these arguments, the best advocates of rationalist internalism can do is to adopt a weaker and more plausible version of normative internalism than (2). The strongest version of this view that is consistent with the considerations above is the following:
 
(2*) Normative internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any actions  and ψ and any rational person S, if S judges that she has a normative reason to , then S is motivated to , if S does not judge that she has a normative reason to ψ which is stronger than, or at least as strong as, her normative reason to , where  and ψ are practically incompatible.

It should be clear that (2*) corresponds to the plausible view mentioned at the beginning of this section.​[20]​ It should also be clear that (2*) is not vulnerable to the difficulties which trouble (2). It does not entail that if a person thinks that she has strongest reason to , but a much weaker reason to ψ, where  and ψ are practically incompatible, she needs to be motivated to ψ in order to be entirely rational. And it does not entail that if a person thinks that she has a reason to  that is exactly as strong as her reason to ψ, where  and ψ are practically incompatible, she needs to be motivated to both  and ψ in order to be entirely rational. 
	Rationalism in (1) together with the new version of normative internalism in (2*) entails the following version of rationalist internalism:

(3*) Rationalist internalism: It is conceptually necessary that for any actions  and ψ any rational person S, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then S is motivated to , if S does not judge that she has a normative reason to ψ which is stronger than, or at least as strong as, her normative reason to , where  and ψ are practically incompatible.

Thus, rationalist internalists have to pay a certain price in order to avoid the problems with (2) and to be able to adopt (2*): they have to accept a version of rationalist internalism that is considerably weaker than (3).​[21]​

5. An Internalist Dilemma
In the last section, I argued that there are reasons to think that normative internalism in (2) is false and that even if it is not, that it is explanatory impotent in a way which means that rationalist internalism in (3) is unable to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. Therefore, rationalist internalists are led to adopt (2*), which means that they have to adopt (3*). In this section, we will see that (3*) is incapable of explaining this conception and that, as a consequence, internalism faces a dilemma.
First, (3*) is not sufficient to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. As we have seen, if a person were to utter a sentence to the effect that it is right to , e.g. ‘Actually, it’s right to give some money to those who need it more than I do’, without being motivated to , we would find this puzzling. According to (3*), it is conceptually necessary that if a person thinks that it is morally right that she s, then she is motivated to  on two conditions: first, that she is rational and, second, that she does not think that she has a conflicting reason to ψ which is stronger than, or at least as strong as, her reason to . This means that (3*) is able to explain why we find it puzzling if a person were to utter a sentence to the effect that it is right to , without being motivated to , only in case we are in the position to assume that these two conditions are fulfilled. However, we would clearly find the mentioned case perplexing even if we do not have any view at all as to whether the second condition is satisfied. That is, in case a person were to utter a sentence to the effect that it is right to , without being motivated to , we would find this puzzling even if we do not have any opinion whatsoever as to whether she thinks that she has a stronger, or at least as strong reason, to perform another action ψ. Moreover, on the view under consideration we cannot simply presume that a person who utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to  does not think that she has a stronger, or at least as strong reason, to ψ. As a result, (3*) is unable to explain our response.
Second, (3*) is not necessary to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. Assume again that a person were to utter a sentence to the effect that it is right to , such as ‘Actually, it’s right to give some money to those who need it more than I do’, without being motivated to . However, assume now that we also know that she does think that she has reason to perform another action ψ which is stronger than her reason to . We may now ask if we would find this case puzzling. I think we would. We would find it puzzling that a person makes such an utterance even if we know that the case has a feature which, according to the view under consideration, would account for the fact that she is not motivated in accordance with it. We would presumably wonder why she says that it is right to  when she is not motivated to ; similarly, we would feel that her utterance lacks any appropriate point in that case.​[22]​ Rationalist internalism in (3*) seems incapable of explaining this. According to this view, the case in question has a feature—the person thinking that she has stronger reasons to ψ than to —that would account for the absence of her motivation to . As we know that the case has this feature, this fact would justify the response that the case under consideration is not particularly strange. However, since we still find it puzzling that she utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to  in this case, (3*) is unable to account for our response.
We can now summarize the internalist dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma: If internalists adopt strong internalism, they can explain our conception of moral language and motivation, but fail to explain why a person might hold a moral judgment without being motivated if she suffers from a certain mental condition. The second horn of the dilemma: If internalists adopt rationalist internalism, their view is susceptible to another difficulty. In fact, they face yet a dilemma. If they adopt normative internalism in (2) so as to defend rationalist internalism in (3), they accept a version of normative rationalism which there are reasons to doubt and which in any case cannot be part of an explanation of our responses to the kind of cases internalists appeal to. As a result, the original version of rationalist internalism, (3), cannot explain our conception of moral language and motivation. However, if they adopt a more plausible version of normative internalism, (2*), they have to accept a weaker version of rationalist internalism, (3*), which is incapable of explaining this conception.
It is worth pointing out that the arguments above do not entail that rationalist internalism in (3*) is false. What they show is that (3*) is incapable of explaining our conception of moral language and motivation. However, this finding has significant implications for our reasons to accept any version of internalism. Let us first recall that the basic reason to adopt internalism is that it assumed to provide such an explanation. Now, consider our finding so far. We saw first that strong internalism is too strong and that internalists have to adopt weak internalism. We then saw that the only plausible version of weak internalism appears to be rationalist internalism since it seems to be the only version that has any hope of both explaining that a person might hold a moral judgment without being motivated and offering a reading of condition C that does not render weak internalism trivial. We then saw that (3*) seems to be the only version of rationalist internalism that is able to avoid the arguments I put forward in relation to normative internalism in (2). However, in this section I have argued that (3*) is unable to explain our conception of moral language and motivation. It follows that we have grounds to be sceptical about internalism in general.
Let me close this section by considering two objections against the general line of argument that leads to the internalist dilemma. 
(A) It might be objected that advocates of rationalist internalism can avoid the internalist dilemma by modifying rationalism. That is, it might be thought that they can adopt another version of rationalism than (1), which can be combined with a more plausible version of normative internalism than (2), and that this enables them to abide by the original formulation of rationalist internalism in (3).
The idea that there are alternative versions of rationalism finds support in the view that judgments to the effect that it is right to  are ambiguous in that they can be understood to entail reasons that vary considerably in strength.​[23]​ Rationalism in (1) is formulated thus: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and person S, if S judges that she ought to , then she judges that she a reason to , i.e. a reason that might be overridden (or even ‘silenced’) by a stronger reason to ψ. Although (1) is the most common version of rationalism, there are undoubtedly other versions of this view.
Let us start by considering a stronger reading of rationalism than (1), according to which a person’s judgment that it is right that she s entails that she is normatively required to .​[24]​ It seems plausible to explicate this idea as follows: (1*) Rationalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and person S, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then she judges that she has strongest reason to . This view can be combined with an alternative reading of normative internalism: (2**) Normative internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and rational person S, if S judges that she has strongest reason to , then she is motivated to . Hence: (3) Rationalist internalism: It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and rational person S, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then she is motivated to . 
It should be admitted that (2**) is more plausible than (2). However, this does not help advocates of rationalist internalism. First, (1*) is clearly less plausible than (1). It seems quite evident that a person may think that it is morally right that she s but at the same time think that she has a stronger reason to ψ. For example, it is easy to imagine an egoist who thinks that it is morally right to help another person but at the same time is convinced that she has a stronger reason to do something that merely promotes her own well-being. Second, it is reasonable to maintain that the new version of rationalism in (1*) is less plausible than the original version of normative internalism in (2), which in turn suggests that the combination (1*)–(3) is less plausible than the original combination (1)–(3).
Let us next consider a weaker reading of rationalism than (1), according to which a person’s judgment that it is right that she s entails that it is normatively permissible for her to . This idea I find more difficult to explicate. However, it seems plausible to understand such a judgment as primarily entailing the absence of a reason of a certain considerable strength against her ing.​[25]​ We might explicate this idea as follows: Rationalism (1**): It is conceptually necessary that, for any action  and rational person S, if S judges that it is morally right that she s, then she judges that it is not the case that she has strongest reason not to .​[26]​ 
It is difficult to see, however, that (1**) can yield a significant version of rationalist internalism. In particular, it does not seem possible to combine rationalism in (3**) with a version of normative internalism which connects a rational person’s judgment about her reason in relation to  with an actual desire to . In particular, if a rational person judges that it is not the case that she has strongest reason not to ϕ, she need not have any desire to . At most, her judgment is compatible with her having a desire to . As a result, (1**) cannot be part of an inference to rationalist internalism in (3).
(B) It can be objected that there might be another version of weak internalism than rationalist internalism that succeeds to avoid the internalist dilemma. This version would then have to understand condition C in another manner than in terms of rationality.
It should be admitted that am not able to rule out this possibility in the present paper, but I think there are reasons to sceptical to the viability of an alternative version weak internalism. 
First, as already pointed out, unless C is understood in terms of rationality, it has shown to be extremely difficult to specify this condition in such a way that weak internalism does not become trivial. According to what seems as the most attractive alternative reading of C, it should be understood as ‘normal conditions’. I have put forward arguments against this suggestion elsewhere and will not repeat them here.​[27]​ 
Second, there are grounds to think that any plausible version of weak internalism is vulnerable to the same arguments as (3*) above, that is, it is unable to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. Rationalist internalism in (3*) claims that there is a certain conceptually necessary connection between a person’s judgment that is right that she s, her judgment about her reason to  and her conflicting reason to ψ, and her motivation to . It is this fact that makes (3*) especially vulnerable to the arguments above. However, it is plausible to think that (3*) captures a close connection between these notions that any version of weak internalism has to respect even if it does not claim this connection is conceptually necessary. As a result, any version of weak internalism will be vulnerable to the same arguments as (3*) irrespective of how it understands C. The following line of thought supports this contention. First, is plausible to assume that a person who thinks that it is right that she s also might think that although she has a reason to , she has a reason to ψ that is stronger than, or at least as strong as, her reason to . (The plausibility of this view is shown by our considerations regarding rationalism in this section.) Second, it is plausible to assume that a person who thinks that she has a reason to , but who also thinks that she has a conflicting reason to ψ that is stronger than, or at least as strong as, her reason to  might not be motivated to . (This claim is plausible in view of the arguments put forward in section 4.) As a result, any plausible version of weak internalism will have to respect the following constraint: A person who thinks that it is right that she s might not be motivated to  if she thinks that she has a conflicting reason to ψ that is stronger than, or at least as strong as, her reason to . Consequently, we would have a version of weak internalism that is vulnerable to the same arguments as (3*) irrespective of how it interprets C. In other words, we would have a version of weak internalism that is unable to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation and that consequently would be vulnerable to the second horn of the internalist dilemma. 
Finally, assume that there is a version of weak internalism that avoids the internalist dilemma. Nonetheless, my arguments show that the most celebrated versions of weak internalism faces this dilemma.  

6. An Externalist Solution
It is generally presumed that externalists have difficulties to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation. However, in this section I will argue that externalism in conjunction with a pragmatic claim which employs Paul Grice’s notion of generalized implicature provides such an explanation.​[28]​ Moreover, I will explain how this view avoids the internalist dilemma. The pragmatic claim I propose is the following:​[29]​
 
A person S’s utterance of a sentence according to which it is morally right that she s carries a generalized conversational implicature (GCI) to the effect that S is motivated to . 

Let us briefly recall Grice’s notion of generalized conversational implicature.​[30]​ That an utterance carries a conversational implicature is mainly a result of the fact that we are presumed to make utterances which adhere to ‘the principle of cooperation’. According to this principle, we are to make utterances which contribute to the mutually accepted purposes of the conversations in which we are involved. We adhere to this principle by following certain maxims which state, for instance, that we are only to make utterances that are relevant in relation to the purposes of the conversation in question. As a result of our adherence to the cooperative principle and the maxims, an utterance of a sentence can carry information that is not part of the conventional meaning of the sentence. This information is referred to as ‘conversational implicature’. Grice distinguishes between two kinds of conversational implicatures. An utterance carries a particularized conversational implicature (PCI) in virtue of the fact that the context in which the utterance is made has certain special features which are distinctive of it. An utterance carries a generalized conversational implicature (GCI) even if the context in which the utterance is made does not have any special features; on the contrary, the utterance carries the implicature unless there are any special features of the context which defeat it. As a result, the utterance standardly carries the implicature and it constitutes a default understanding of the utterance. 
To simplify, the pragmatic claim above is based on three simple assumptions. First, it is obvious that a sentence to the effect that it is morally right to  entails that there is a moral reason—a reason according to morality—to .​[31]​ Second, it is plausible to assume that it is a general purpose of moral conversations to influence actions; moral conversations generally have as a purpose to contribute to people performing, or not performing, certain actions. Moreover, it is a basic fact about human psychology that one way to affect people’s behaviour is to let them know about our attitudes towards it. 
Consider a person who is involved in a moral conversation and utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to , e.g. ‘Actually, it’s right to give some money to those who need it more than I do’. In consideration of the general purpose of moral conversations, it is plausible to assume that she wants that  is performed. The basic reason is that it does not seem relevant to utter a sentence which entails that there is a moral reason to  in a moral conversation where a general purpose is to influence actions unless one wants that  is performed. In other words, given that a general purpose of moral conversations is to influence actions, and a person utters a sentence which entails that there is moral reason to , we understand her as wanting that  is performed, since if she does not want this, her utterance lacks in relevance. Such an utterance would simply lack point in consideration of the purpose of the discourse. Hence, the person’s utterance carries a conversational implicature to the effect that she wants that  is performed. Moreover, this is a matter of a GCI. We have seen that it is plausible to assume that it is a general purpose of moral conversations to influence actions; that is, it is a purpose which pervades throughout various contexts independently of their special features. As a consequence, an utterance of sentence to the effect that it is right to  standardly carries this implicature and it qualifies therefore as a GCI. 
In consideration of the fact that there is a standardized connection between people’s utterances of a sentence to the effect that it is right to  and the information that they have the mentioned attitude, we associate utterances of this type of sentence with the attitude and need not work out the implicature in order to recognize that these utterances convey the attitude.​[32]​ As a consequence, when we encounter an utterance of such a sentence we can immediately infer that the person in question has the mentioned attitude without reflecting on the particular context of the utterance.
It might be objected that a moral utterance can convey that a person has a motivating attitude towards an action even in a context where it is not a purpose of the conversation to influence action.​[33]​ The present view is however able to explain this. We have seen that a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which it is right to  carries a GCI to the effect that she wants  to be performed. As a consequence, there is a strong background presumption that someone who uses such a sentence does want  to be performed. This means that a person’s utterance of such a sentence carries this implicature unless she cancels it by making an additional utterance to the effect that the background assumption does no hold in that particular case or the context cancels the implicature by containing information to this effect. 
When a person utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to , we presume that she thinks that it is right that she s unless another utterance of hers or the context indicates otherwise; we assume she does not make an exception for herself unless something indicates so.​[34]​ As a result, a person’s utterance of such a sentence carries a GCI to the effect that she wants that she s and, hence, is motivated to , unless she makes an additional utterance, or the context contains information, which cancels the implicature. 
We are now in the position to see how externalism in conjunction with the pragmatic claim avoids the general problem involved in the internalist dilemma.
First, this conjunction of views is able to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation which constitutes the main argument for internalism. If a person were to utter a sentence to the effect that it is right to , without being motivated to , we would find this puzzling. Internalism explains this by claiming that there is a conceptually necessary connection between a person’s judgment that it is right that she s and her motivation to . According to the pragmatic claim, it is ultimately an utterance of such a sentence which carries a GCI to the effect that the person in question is motivated to . As it is a matter of a GCI, and such an utterance standardly carries the implicature, there is a strong presumption that a person who makes such an utterance is motivated to . Consequently, in case a person is not motivated to  in spite of making such an utterance, we find this puzzling. We can justify this response further by referring to the fact that she has not adhered to the cooperative principle. In particular, she has violated this principle since she has made an utterance that is not relevant in consideration of the general purpose of moral conversations. Thus, this view avoids the part of the internalist dilemma which troubles weak internalism.
Second, this conjunction of views is able to account for cases where a person holds a moral judgment but is not motivated to act in accordance with it because of her mental condition. According to externalism, it is not conceptually necessary that if a person judges that it is right that she s, she is motivated to . Consequently, a person who suffers from a certain mental condition, such as severe depression, can judge that it is right that she s without being motivated to .​[35]​ Thus, this view avoids the part of the internalist dilemma which troubles strong internalism.
It might be objected that the pragmatic claim I have proposed merely explains that (i) we find it puzzling that a person utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to  without being motivated to , not that (ii) we find it puzzling that a person thinks (i.e. judges) that it is right that she s without being accordingly motivated. 
There are, I think, a number of various considerations that help to explain (ii), but in this paper I will merely make some principal points.​[36]​ 	
We might start by observing that internalists generally appeal to (i), but very seldom to (ii), which indicates that the former are more in want of explanation than the latter. 
However, what is most important is that (ii) can be explained by the pragmatic claim. Indeed, explanations of this kind are customary in the pragmatic literature.​[37]​ We can separate between three considerations that together help to explain (ii).
First, as a consequence of there being a very close connection between utterances of a certain type of sentence and a GCI, we associate the GCI with the belief expressed by this type of sentence. We have seen that utterances that carry a GCI standardly carry the implicature. In particular, in such cases the implicature constitutes the default understanding of the utterances since they carry it across various contexts irrespective of their particular features. In view of there being such an extremely tight connection between uses of a particular type of sentence and a certain GCI, it is plausible to assume that we associate the GCI with the belief that is expressed by the sentence in virtue of its conventional meaning. As a result, we are puzzled if a person is reported to hold the belief without the GCI being in place. For example, if we are told that person A thinks that person B ate an apple or an orange, we presume that A does not think that B ate an apple and an orange. We would consequently be puzzled if we are told that A’s beliefs do not adhere to this pattern. However, it is generally agreed that the sentence ‘He ate an apple or an orange’ does not, merely by virtue of its meaning, express a belief which entails that the person in question did not ate both an apple and an orange. This means that the explanation of our puzzlement cannot be provided by the meaning of the sentence. According to the prevalent view, it is rather the case that utterances of a sentence of the type ‘He ate an apple or an orange’ carry a GCI to the effect that the person in question did not ate both an apple and an orange.​[38]​ This suggests that we instead should explain our puzzlement in terms of this pragmatic but standardized connection. Thus, it is plausible to assume that we associate the GCI with the belief which the sentence, by virtue of its meaning, expresses. As a result, we are puzzled if we are told that A thinks that B ate an apple or an orange at the same time as A thinks that B ate an apple and an orange. Corresponding explanations are available in the moral case. According to the pragmatic claim, a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which it is right to  carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to , in which case such utterances standardly carry this implicature. It is plausible to assume that we therefore associate this GCI with the belief that is expressed by the sentence in virtue of its conventional meaning.​[39]​ As a consequence, we are puzzled if we are told that a person thinks that it is right that she s without being motivated to .​[40]​
Second, as a consequence of the fact that we can infer a GCI immediately from utterances of a certain type of sentence, we associate the GCI with the belief expressed by this type of sentence. We saw above that if utterances of a certain type of sentence carry a certain GCI we can infer this implicature immediately without considering the particular features of the situation in which the utterance is made.​[41]​ For example, since utterances of a sentence of the type ‘He ate an apple or an orange’ carry the GCI mentioned above, we can infer immediately without considering the particular features of the situation that someone who utters such a sentence thinks that the person in question did not eat both an apple and an orange. It is plausible to assume that this makes us associate the GCI with the belief that the sentence expresses by virtue of its conventional meaning. Consequently, we are puzzled if we are told that A in the example above thinks that B ate both an apple and an orange. In my view, a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which it is right to  carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to , in which case utterances of such a sentence standardly carry this implicature. This means that we can infer immediately that a person who uses such a sentence is motivated to . It is plausible to assume that this makes us associate this GCI with the belief that is expressed by such a sentence by virtue of its meaning. As a result, we are puzzled if we are told that a person thinks that it is right that she s without being motivated to . 
Third, as a consequence of the close connection between utterances of a certain type of sentence and a GCI, we tend to conflate meaning and GCI. Grice emphasizes that when utterances of a certain type of sentence carry a certain GCI, it is easy to conflate the meaning of the sentence with the GCI since there is such a close connection between uses of such a sentence and the GCI.​[42]​ Indeed, it is precisely this kind of pragmatic fallacy that I contend that internalists commit. Now, someone who makes this mistake is committed to the view that it would not be possible for a person to think that it is right that she s without being motivated to . The fact that we are liable to make this mistake provides additional explanation of why we are puzzled if we are told that a person thinks that it is right that she s without being motivated to .  

7. The Externalist Solution and Rational Internalism
In the last section, I argued that externalism in conjunction with the pragmatic claim escapes the internalist dilemma. However, for this contention to be correct, I need also to show that the pragmatic claim is not vulnerable to the problems of the two versions of rationalist internalism in (3) and (3*).
First, it is clearly not vulnerable to the arguments in relation to rationalist internalism in (3) since it is not committed to normative internalism in (2). 
Second, it is not either vulnerable to the two arguments in relation rationalist internalism in (3*) in Section 5. Let us see why this is the case in more detail. 
Let us start by seeing why the pragmatic claim is not vulnerable to the first argument against (3*). According to (3*), it is conceptually necessary that if a person thinks that it is right that she s, then she is motivated to  on condition that she is rational and does not think that she has a conflicting reason to ψ which is stronger than, or at least as strong as, her reason to . However, the pragmatic claim does not presume that there is any conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation of this kind. This means that our conception of the connection between moral utterances and motivation is not constrained by the person in question fulfilling the mentioned condition. It is a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which it is right to  which carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to . This means in turn that in case a person makes such an utterance, but is not motivated to , we might find this puzzling even if we do not have any view at all as to whether she thinks she has a stronger, or at least as strong, reason to perform another action ψ. The explanation is that such an utterance carries the mentioned implicature irrespective of whether she satisfies the mentioned condition or not. 
Let us next note that the pragmatic claim is not vulnerable to the second argument against (3*). If a person were to utter a sentence according to which it is right to , without being motivated to , and we know that she does think she has stronger reasons to ψ, we might still find it puzzling that she makes such an utterance. According to the pragmatic claim, the explanation is that her utterance carries a GCI to the effect that she is motivated to  even if she does not satisfy the mentioned condition. As I suggested above, we would presumably wonder why she makes the utterance in spite of not being motivated to  and feel that her utterance does not have any conceivable point in such a situation. The pragmatic claim readily explains this by referring to the fact that her utterance does not conform to a general purpose of moral conversations.
We have seen that there might be cases where a person who thinks that it is right that she s fails to be motivated to  as a result of her mental condition. It is therefore plausible to think that there might be cases where a person utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to  but where we do not assume that she is motivated to  because we believe that she finds herself in a certain mental condition. The fact that GCIs are cancellable is able to account for this fact. There are basically two ways in which an implicature can be cancelled: the person who makes the original utterance can annul the implicature by making an additional utterance or the context of the utterance is such that it annuls the implicature.​[43]​ Thus, the GCI I identified above can be cancelled if the speaker, or the context of her utterance, indicates that she finds herself in a mental condition which makes it the case that is she not motivated to . Suppose that a person utters a sentence which says that it is right to  but then adds an additional utterance to the effect that she feels, say, very depressed. Alternatively, suppose that a person makes such an utterance in a context in which it is generally known that she is severely depressed. Suppose further that in either case it is commonly assumed that her mental condition relates to  in such a way that it is reasonable to believe that it can defeat her motivation to . In either case, the GCI in question can be cancelled, in which case we do not presume that she is motivated to .

8. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. Strong internalism is able to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for cases where moral judgment and motivation take separate paths. Conversely, the most plausible version of weak internalism is able to account for such cases, but fails to explain our conception of moral language and motivation. Moreover, I have argued that externalism in conjunction with a certain pragmatic claim succeeds to account for both these notions. There is consequently reason to think that this view is preferable to internalism.​[44]​

References
Arpaly, N. (2000), ‘On Acting Rationally against One’s Best Judgment’, Ethics, Vol. 110, pp. 488–513.
Audi, R. (1997), ‘Moral Judgment and Reasons for Action’, Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. by Garrett 	Cullity and Berys Gaut, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 125–160.
Bach, K. And R. Harnish (1998 (1979)), ‘Indirect Acts and Illucutionary Standardization’, Pragmatics, ed. A. 
Kasher, vol IV, London: Routledge, pp. 682–711.
Bedke, M. S. (2009), ‘Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism from Amoralism’, Philosophical 
Studies, vol. 144, pp. 189–209.
Blackburn, S. (1998), Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Broome, J. (2007), ‘Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?’, Journal of Moral 	Philosophy, Vol. 4, pp. 349–374.
Choi, S. (2006), ‘The Simple vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions’, Synthese, Vol. 148, 
pp. 369–379.
Copp, D. (1997), ‘Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem’, Ethics, Vol. 	108, pp. 33–54.
Copp, D. (2001), ‘Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism’, Social Philosophy and 	Policy, Vol. 18, pp. 1–43.
Copp, D. (2009), ‘Realist-expressivism and Conventional Implicature’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. 
by R. Shafer-Landau, Vol. 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167–202.
Dancy, J. (1993), Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell.
Darwall, S. (1990), ‘Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals’, Noûs, Vol. 24, pp. 257–
267.
Dreier, J., (1990), ‘Internalism and Speaker Relativism’, Ethics, Vol. 101, pp. 6–25.
Finlay, S. (2004), ‘The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, 
pp. 205–223.
Finlay, S. (2005), ‘Value and Implicature’, Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 5, pp. 1–20. 
Frankena, W. (1976 (1958)), ‘Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy’, Perspectives 	on Morality. Essays by William K. Frankena, ed. By K. E. Goodpaster, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 12–23.
Gert, J. (2004), Brute Rationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gert, J. (2008), ‘Michael Smith and the Rationality of Immoral Action’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 12, 
	pp. 1–23.
Gibbard, A. (2003), Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Grice, P. H. (1989 (1975)), ‘Logic and Conversation’, Studies in the Ways of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: 	Harvard University Press, pp. 22–40.
Grice, P. H. (1981), ‘Presupposition and Conversational Implicature’, Radical Pragmatics, ed. by Peter Cole, 
New York: Academic Press, pp. 183–198.
Johnson, M. (1992), ‘How to Speak of Colors’, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 68, pp. 221–263.
Joyce, R. (2003), The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, C. (1986), ‘Skepticism About Practical Reason’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
LXXXIII, pp. 311–334.
Lenman, J. (1999), ‘The Externalist and the Amoralist’, Philosophia, Vol. 27, pp. 441–457.
Levinson, S. (2000), Presumptive Meanings, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Lewis, D. (1999), ‘Finkish Dispositions’, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–151.
Mele, A. (2003), Motivation and Agency, New York: Oxford University Press.
Miller, A. (2003), An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Miller, B. C. (2008), ‘Motivational Internalism’, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 139, pp. 233–255.
Morgan, J. L. (1998 (1978)), ‘Two Types of Convention in Indirect Speech Acts’, Pragmatics, ed. by A.
	Kasher, Vol. IV, London: Routledge, pp. 639–657.
Parfit, D. (1997), ‘Reasons and Motivation’, The Aristotelian Society, Vol. LXXI, pp. 99–130. 
Parfit, D. (2001), ‘Rationality and Reasons’, Exploring Practical Philosophy. From Action to Values, ed. 	by 
Jonas Josefsson, Björn Petersson and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Hampshire: Ashgate, pp. 17–39.
Rabinowicz, W. and T. Ronnøw-Rasmussen (2004), ‘The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-	attitudes 
and Value’, Ethics, Vol. 114, pp. 391–423.
Ridge, M. (2007), ‘Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?’, Oxford Studies in 	Metaethics, ed. 
by Russ Shafer-Landau, Vol. 2, pp. 51–76.
Roojen, M. van (2002), ‘Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism About Moral Judgments’, Philosophy 	and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 65, pp. 26–49.
Roskies, A. (2003), ‘Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from “Acquired 	Sociopathy”’, Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 16, pp. 51–66.
Sayre-McCord, G. (1997), ‘The Metaethical Problem’, Ethics, Vol. 108, pp. 55–83.
Searle, J. (1969), Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Schroeder, M. (2007), Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Setiya, K. (2004), ‘Against Internalism’, Noûs, Vol. 38, pp. 266–298
Shafer-Landau, R. (2003), Moral Realism. A Defence, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1993), ‘Some Problems for Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism’, Philosophical 	Studies, 
Vol. 69, pp. 297–313.
Smith, M. (1994), The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell.
Smith, M. (1997), ‘In Defense of The Moral Problem’, Ethics, Vol. 108, pp. 84–117.
Soames, S. (2003), The Age of Meaning, Vol. 2, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stevenson, C. (1944), Ethics and Language, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stocker, M. (1979), ‘Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology’, The Journal of Philosophy, 	Vol. LXXVI, pp. 738–753.
Strandberg, C. (2007), ‘Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation’, Philosophia, Vol. 35, pp. 249–
260.
Strandberg, C. (forthcoming a), ‘A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research.
Strandberg, C. (forthcoming b), ‘Expressivism and Dispositional Desires’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly.
Svavarsdóttir, S. (1999), ‘Moral Cognitivism and Motivation’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 108, pp. 
161–219.
Tresan, J. (2006), ‘De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism’, Noûs, Vol. 40, pp. 143–165.
Wallace, R. Jay (2006), ‘Moral Motivation’, Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, ed. by James Dreier, 	Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 182–196.
Wedgwood, R. (2002), ‘Practical Reason and Desire’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80, pp. 
345–358.
Wedgwood, R. (2007), The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, T. (2009), ‘Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives’, The Philosophy of 












^1	  I am grateful to a referee for The Journal of Moral Philosophy for stressing this alternative.
^2	  It might be thought that the so-called fetishist argument provides such an argument (Smith 1994), pp. 71–77). However, it seems fair to say that the extensive discussion of this argument has shown that it is unconvincing. See e.g. Strandberg (2007), pp. 249–260.
^3	  I formulate internalism in a way that is neutral between de dicto and de re internalism (see Tresan (2006), pp. 143–165). I use ‘judgment’ in way that is neutral between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It is also worth mentioned that my solution to the internalist dilemma is compatible with communal versions of internalism (see e.g. Tresan (2006), pp. 143–165, and Bedke (2009), pp. 189–209). 
^4	  If a person utters a sentence to the effect that it is right to , we presume that she thinks that it is right that she s unless she or the context indicates otherwise. I will adhere to the simpler formulation in what follows.
^5	  See e.g. Lenman (1999), pp. 441–457, and Joyce (2001), pp. 17–29. 
^6	  See e.g. Stevenson (1944), pp. 16​–17; Frankena (1973 (1958)), p. 100; Korsgaard (1986), p. 9; Dreier (1991), pp. 13–14; Dancy (1993), p. 4; Smith (1994), p. 60; Blackburn (1998), pp. 48, 52–53; Lenman (1999), pp. 443–446; Joyce (2001), pp. 26–27; van Roojen (2002), p. 32; Finlay (2004), pp. 206, 212; Shafer-Landau (2003) p. 156; Ridge (2007), p. 51, and Bedke (2009), pp. 189–209.
^7	  See Dreier (1990), pp. 13–14. Cf. Dancy (1993), p. 25.
^8	  This kind of reasoning is familiar in metaethics; see e.g. Smith (1994), esp. Ch. 3 and 5, and Korsgaard (1986), pp. 5–25. Cf. Audi (1997), pp. 137–138; Wallace (2006), pp. 182–196, and Wedgwood (2007), esp. Ch. 1. 
^9	  Normative internalism is seldom explicitly defended although it is presumed in various arguments. For clear formulations of it, see e.g. Darwall (1990), p. 258; Smith (1994), p. 148; Parfit (1997), p. 104; Wedgwood (2002), p. 347, and Setiya (2004), p. 268. (However, of these authors only Smith explicitly endorses it.)
^10	  See e.g. Sayre-McCord (1997), pp. 64​–65; Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 164–165; Miller (2003), p. 221, and Roskies (2003), p. 53. 
^11	  It might be thought that she also needs to be most motivated to ; but see Arpaly (2000), pp. 488–513, and Broome (2007), pp. 368–374. For some defenders of this view, see Scanlon (1998), pp. 25–30; Parfit (2001), pp. 15–40; Broome (2007), pp. 349–374¸ and Wedgwood (2007), esp. Ch. 1. 
^12	  See Sinnott-Armstrong (1992), p. 302; Copp (1997), pp. 45–46; Wallace (2006), pp. 187–188, and Gert (2008), pp. 16–17. Cf. Schroeder (2007), 166–167.
^13	  See e.g. Mele (2003), pp. 30–33.
^14	  See e.g. Johnson (1992), pp. 221–263; Lewis (1999), pp. 133–151, and Choi (2006), pp. 369–379.
^15	  It might be argued that a rational person who thinks that she has a strong reason to accept a medical treatment, but a weak reason to decline it, has to be less disposed to accept the treatment than she otherwise would have been. In this sense, it might be objected, she is disposed to decline treatment. It is a difficult issue what it means to say that a disposition is weakened (cf. Mele (2003), Ch. 7), but two comments are worth making. First, it does not seem conceptually necessary that a rational person who thinks she has an extremely strong reason to accept a medical treatment needs to be less disposed to accept it merely because she thinks she has an extremely weak reason to decline it on the ground that she will not be able to drink coffee for one minute. It seems reasonable to think that a rational person can be unaffected by such petty considerations. Second, it can be argued that the kind of phenomena appealed to in this objection is consistent with my argument. The fact that a person is less disposed to accept the treatment than she otherwise would have been does not seem to entail that she is disposed to decline the treatment. The latter seems to be a quite distinct disposition. 
^16	  This kind of cases might be controversial due to the distinction between object-given and state-given reasons. See e.g. Parfit (2001), pp. 21–23, and Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004), pp. 411–414.
^17	  Cf. Wedgwood (2002), p. 349.
^18	  Cf. Gert (2004), p. 143.
^19	  See e.g. Smith (1994), pp. 35–39. 
^20	  That is, it is conceptually necessary that if a person thinks that she has strongest reason to , then she is motivated to  in so far as she is rational.
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